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Shame campaigns and environmental justice:  
Corporate shaming as activist strategy 
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Shame	  campaigns	  aim	  to	  change	   industry	  practices	  by	  targeting	  the	  reputational	  value	  
of	   individual	   firms.	   They	   occupy	   a	   contested	   political	   space	   from	  which	   they	   leverage	  
existing	   inequalities	   in	   the	  market	   to	   redress	   political	   inequalities	   on	   the	   ground.	   This	  
article	  assesses	  two	  such	  campaigns	  –	  the	  No	  Dirty	  Gold	  and	  Global	  Finance	  campaigns	  –	  
based	  upon	  their	  ability	  to	  overcome	  the	  limitations	  of	  relying	  on	  markets	  for	   leverage	  
and	  selectively	  targeting	  firms	  directly.	  While	  activists	  connect	  companies’	  right	  to	  profit	  
with	   social	   and	   environmental	   responsibilities,	   they	   do	   not	   directly	   tackle	  
overconsumption	   and	   have	   done	   little	  work	   to	   reduce	   economic	   inequality.	   However,	  
campaigners	   work	   to	   rectify	   existing	   political	   inequalities	   through	   their	   efforts	   to	  
promote	   transparency,	   supply	   educational	   information,	   and	   facilitate	   inclusive	   debate	  
amongst	   stakeholders.	   While	   shame	   campaigns	   reflect	   many	   of	   the	   inherent	  
contradictions	   of	   global	   civil	   society,	   activists	  manage	   to	   challenge	   unwanted	   industry	  
activities	  by	  circumventing	  the	  state	  institutions	  that	  facilitate	  their	  imposition.	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Introduction 
There often appears to be a discrepancy between the resources available to environmental 
activists and the scope of their ambitions. This is especially true for those embracing a 
comprehensive vision of environmental justice. Despite its contested parameters, 
environmental justice was usefully defined by David Schlosberg (2004) as concerning equity 
in the distribution of environmental risk, recognition of the diversity of the participants and 
experiences in affected communities, and participation in the political processes which create 
and manage environmental policy. Recently, the use of the term has expanded yet further, 
encompassing an ever broader range of issues and levels of analysis, including being 
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extended to communities and the human relationship with the nonhuman world (Schlosberg 
2013). While environmental quality and human equality are inextricably linked (Agyeman et 
al. 2003), this expanded mandate also creates dilemmas for activists. Not only might activists 
occasionally face trade-offs when pursuing both ecological and social justice goals, but 
campaign energies may become diluted when attempting to tackle such a broad set of 
concerns (Newell 2006). In this article, I explore how activists attempt to balance these 
potential trade-offs while maximizing their impact by confronting corporations directly using 
market-based, shame campaigns.  
Activists must be selective regarding the issues they focus on and the tactics they use 
to achieve their goals due to their limited resources (Richards and Heard 2005). One such 
tactic is the market-based, shame campaign, which targets the most branded and thus 
vulnerable firms within a production chain and attempts to shame them into demanding 
sustainable practices from their suppliers (Sasser 2003, Schurman 2004). I define shame 
campaigns as activist campaigns that make strategic use of public shaming – a tactic built 
upon the notion that when a consumer-facing firm’s brand reputation is linked to unsavoury 
practices along their supply chains, the firm’s management will be incentivised through 
economic and social pressure to join activists in condemning these practices. Economically, 
targeted firms may be concerned with damage to their brand value, losing customers to a 
boycott, diminished prospects for recruiting and retaining employees, and a weakened ability 
to raise capital (Klein 1999, Baron 2003, Sasser et al. 2006). Sociologically, activists reframe 
the issue in ways that associate the negative ecological and social impacts of the industry 
with specific companies and the individuals within them, which may clash with the corporate 
culture of the firm and the personal worldviews of its leadership (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 
Khagram et al. 2002).  
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Recent examples include the high profile campaign focused on the apparel industry 
that targeted Nike and similarly branded companies, as well as the campaign against the 
forestry industry that took aim at Home Depot and other DIY retailers (Gereffi et al. 2001, 
Bartley 2003). Directly targeting firms has proven effective at spurring corporations to reduce 
their exposure to such attacks by changing their practices, collaborating with 
environmentalists, and committing to various non-state regulatory initiatives, creating a 
political space outside the state system in which threats to the public interest may be 
challenged (Wapner 1996, Ruggie 2004). However, there are limitations to these market-
based, shame campaigns.  
As products of their historical context, these campaigns rely on non-state and often 
market-based solutions to regulating global industries. Paul Gilding, the former head of 
Greenpeace, famously summed up the mood of activists when he said: ‘OK, you want to play 
markets – let’s play’ (Friedman 2001). As such, they appear to work within the current 
system of a deregulated economy and, therefore, are somewhat limited by its requisites. The 
necessarily selective nature of direct targeting not only limits the use of this strategy to 
certain types of firms and industries, but it risks reproducing inequalities within commodity 
chains and across regions while the results they achieve may inadvertently reinforce the 
status quo. However, activists are often self-reflective about these potential shortcomings and 
employ a variety of tactics to overcome the limits to their approach.  
In this article, I focus on two campaigns – the No Dirty Gold (NDG) and Global 
Finance (GF) campaigns – identifying and comparing the tactics utilised by activists to 
maximise their impact while attempting to avoid simply reinforcing existing practices and 
power asymmetries. I selected the campaigns based on their shared endeavour to change 
practices within extractive industries by targeting vulnerable nodes in natural resource 
production chains. Both campaigns make strategic use of public shaming to achieve their 
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goals; the NDG activists focus on the retail node for gold jewellery while the GF 
campaigners target the financial node for extractive projects.  
I collected data for this qualitative study from campaign publications, websites, and 
reliable mainstream media sources to supplement information drawn from interviews I 
conducted with 45 civil society and industry actors, including eight interviews with key 
informants from the two campaigns.1 I selected interviewees based on their involvement in 
the campaigns and recruited them through their respective organisation’s website. The 
interviews were semi-structured and conducted in person where possible, though a few were 
necessarily conducted by phone, with questions focused on the strategic decisions behind 
campaign design, the goals of the campaigners, and the ways in which they attempt to 
maximise their impact despite the limitations to such an approach. While both campaigns 
have faced difficulties actually impacting the bottom-line of their targets, they have managed 
to compel industry to adjust their practices with responses ranging from single-firm standards 
to industry-wide certification. The criteria by which I judge the campaign strategies, which 
constitutes the core framework for comparison, is distilled from the literatures on global civil 
society and market-based activist campaigns. 
 
The campaigns 
The NDG campaign was started in 2004 by Earthworks (formerly the Mineral Policy 
Center), a small NGO focused exclusively on the mining industry, and Oxfam America. 
While campaigners at Earthworks initially conceived of the campaign, they felt they needed 
to get a big NGO ‘of note’ and Oxfam had the brand equity (NDG, personal communication, 
September 20, 2010). Even once they had Oxfam’s name behind them, they still had limited 
resources and did not want to risk losing any credibility, and thus leverage, by hitting 
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companies that they did not think would budge without achieving any bottom-line impact 
(NDG, personal communication, September 20, 2010). Therefore, their initial focus was on 
the high-end jewellery specialists who traded on their brand name and image. Based in 
Washington DC, but with field offices in Berkeley, Durango and Missoula, the campaign’s 
goals are captured in its ‘Golden Rules’, which is a pledge for jewellers to only source gold 
from projects adhering to numerous social and environmental criteria.  
The No Dirty Gold campaign’s Golden Rules 
 
 
• Respect basic human rights as outlined in international conventions and laws; 
• Obtain the free, prior and informed consent of impacted communities; 
• Respect workers’ rights and labor standards including safety; 
• Not operating in areas of armed or militarized conflict; 
• Not forcing communities off their lands; 
• Not using water bodies or streams for mine waste or tailings; 
• Not operating in fragile ecosystems, protected areas, or other places of high conservation or 
ecological value; 
• Not polluting water, soil or air with acid drainage or other toxic chemicals; 
• Paying all costs of closure and reclamation of mine sites; 
• Allowing independent verification audits. 
 
 
Table	  1:	  NDG	  Golden	  Rules	  (adapted	  from	  www.nodirtygold.org)	  
	  
The activists attempt to incentivise jewellers to sign the pledge through a number of public 
shaming tactics that take aim at their well-established brands. These tactics include grassroots 
street demonstrations and letter writing, use of the media in the form of advertisements in the 
New York Times and industry journals, and the use of the internet to disseminate information, 
coordinate email campaigns, and provide media kits for journalists.2 The results achieved 
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thus far include work to establish criteria for responsible mining, such as the ‘Golden Rules’ 
themselves as well as the more elaborate ‘Framework Convention for Responsible Mining 
Practices’ (Miranda et al. 2005). Their efforts have also indirectly led to an industry-led 
initiative to certify the jewellery supply chain through the Responsible Jewellery Council 
(RJC) as well as the creation of the multi-stakeholder Initiative for Responsible Mining 
Assurance (IRMA), which seeks to certify individual mine sites and is set for launch in 2014. 
The GF campaign was started in 2000 by the Rainforest Action Network (RAN), a 
direct-targeting NGO based in San Francisco. The campaigners believe that banks should 
take responsibility for the social and environmental impacts of their investments and develop 
policy safeguards to ensure they are not financing projects that are needlessly destructive. Jim 
Gollin, chair of the group, offers a to-the-point summary of the group’s approach to 
environmental advocacy: ‘Most environmental groups try to get the government to enforce 
changes of behaviour on people and corporations. Thirty years ago, that was the cutting edge, 
but I feel there’s very little cheese down that path now. At RAN, we essentially ignore 
Washington, ignore politics, ignore regulations and regulatory structures, and focus instead 
on making deals with corporations’ (Gollin 2005).  
Their actual tactics are similar to the NDG campaign in that they take aim at the bank 
brands using shaming tactics. One example is their use of advertising throughout the 
campaign with ‘[y]ears filled with advertisements on CNN and the New York Times,’ 
explains Michael Brune, ‘When Sandy Weil (former chairman of Citibank) was vacationing 
in Europe, we took out an ad in the International Herald Tribune. We create pressure by 
raising awareness, and then investors, employees, and customers usually ask how they can 
help. Executives get it from all sides’ (Brune 2006).  In addition to advertisements in 
mainstream media, the group’s activities include grassroots demonstrations, shareholder 
activism and letter writing, and use of the internet to maintain a network of activist groups, 
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trace bank lending and investment, and disseminate information. The element of shame at the 
core of the campaign is laid bare in a study by David Baron and Erin Yurday (2004), based 
on conversations with GF campaigners: 
‘By the spring of 2003, action at universities had increased, particularly at 
Columbia, and the [GF] campaign became personal as activists canvassed 
Citigroup CEO Sandy Weill’s hometown. Adding to Citigroup’s vulnerability, 
Weill was on the verge of retiring from the CEO position. RAN believed that the 
attention generated by its campaign could jeopardize Weill’s legacy and 
reputation.’ 
These tactics seemingly achieve results as many of the banks targeted, including Citigroup, 
Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs, have developed first-party 
standards for responsible investment. Additionally, through their engagement with the Bank 
Track, a network of activists focused on the financial sector, GF campaigners have supported 
the establishment of the ‘Collevecchio Declaration’, which is a universal set of standards 
industry signatories agree to abide by. 
The Collevecchio Declaration 
 
 
• Commitment to sustainability; 
• Commitment to ‘do no harm’; 
• Commitment to responsibility; 
• Commitment to accountability; 
• Commitment to transparency; 
• Commitment to sustainable markets and governance. 
 
 





In the following section, I outline the potential limitations of this type of activist activity that 
have been considered in the global civil society and market-based activist campaign 
literatures before turning to an empirical study of how the NDG and GF campaigns attempt to 
overcome these limitations. The findings reflect both the opportunities and limitations of 
pursuing environmental justice campaigns outside the state system and the tactical 
innovations activists employ to maximise their impact. 
 
Potential limitations of shame campaigns 
The limitations facing civil society campaigns that target firms directly are two-fold: first, 
they run the risk of promoting a regulatory culture based on market solutions and individual 
responsibility while ignoring deeper systemic issues and, second, their selection bias as to 
which industries and markets to target forgoes comprehensive regulatory coverage and may 
simply reinforce global power asymmetries.  
 
Market-based solutions to systemic problems 
The first concern relates to the difficult task of effecting meaningful change while working 
outside the state system and within the market landscape. While shame campaigns attempt to 
highlight and change unsustainable practices, the end result tends to be a glut of non-state 
initiatives that, arguably, have difficulty challenging the underlying systemic causes of 
environmental degradation and risk shifting political concerns to a technical arena (Stringer 
2006). This is why some scholars have expressed doubt as to the ability of market-based, 
civil society initiatives to alter industrial practices in a meaningful way (Mutersbaugh et al. 
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2005, Taylor 2005, Klooster 2006, 2010). Indeed, one of the major ways in which market-
based initiatives achieve popular support is that they tend to not tackle the tough issues, such 
as, overconsumption and inequality (Princen et al. 2002).  
Market-friendly initiatives conform to what Steven Bernstein (2001) has called 
‘liberal environmentalism’, which is the product of attempts to reconcile global 
environmental protection with the promotion of the liberal economic order and its tenets of 
economic growth, efficiency, and corporate freedom. This compromise approach to 
environmental protection is epitomized by the concept of ‘sustainable development’ and 
views environmental problems as stemming from such drivers as the poverty forcing 
populations to eke out unsustainable livelihoods, market failures leading to negative 
environmental externalities, a lack of technological innovation that would otherwise increase 
industrial efficiency, and weak institutions that have proven insufficient at facilitating 
adequate cooperation at the global level (see also Clapp and Dauvergne 2005 for a detailed 
discussion). 
Unlike these market-friendly approaches to environmentalism, tackling 
overconsumption and inequality demands that people accept less. For example, while the 
eradication of poverty is a goal that finds few dissenters, reducing inequality is a much 
tougher sell (Bloomfield 2012). 
  
The selective nature of corporate targeting 
The second concern focuses on the selective nature of campaign targeting, which itself has 
two potential limitations: campaigns may only be effective for certain industries and could 




Only effective for certain industries 
A key concern with market-based, shame campaigns is that there seems to be limited scope 
for the types of industries they could be effective on. They do not target the firms that 
actually carry out the most irresponsible practices directly and many of the worst violators 
will go unpunished as they remain insulated from this type of action. An industry must have a 
branded node in the commodity chain that draws significant value from its reputation so 
activists can pose a credible risk to its business interests. Relatedly, campaign effectiveness 
will be increased if the product they provide is visible to end-use consumers so they can 
choose to avoid these products if they so choose. Additionally, this product cannot be a 
necessity and, if it is highly desirable, the campaign chances for success increase with the 
number of viable substitutes available.  
Regardless of which commodity or product is being targeted, most successful market 
campaigns have focused on either the US or the EU market for products. Even though the 
gold jewellery markets in China and India dwarf that of the US, the NDG campaign focuses 
on the US market as it is seen to hold the most latent potential for leveraging consumer 
demand for jewellery made from ‘responsible’ gold. Likewise, the GF campaign focuses on 
the largest US banks, while large but less branded funds as well as commercial and 
investment banks from developing countries avoid this exposure. There are numerous reasons 
for this, including the political culture of these markets as well as the location of the 
campaigns themselves. While the strategic rationale is seemingly sound, the repercussions 
can be significant. 
The selectivity with which shame campaigns are waged leads to an uneven approach 
to global business regulation and, therefore, such campaigns will probably not lead to 
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comprehensive coverage (Newell 2001, Falkner 2003). Additionally, scholars note that 
campaigns must affect a wider range of actors than simply Western consumers if they are to 
make a significant impact on global trade in any commodity (Nest 2011). At least equally 
important is the potential for the selective nature of campaign targeting to lead to the perverse 
effect of reinforcing unequal power relations between the global rich and poor. 
 
Risk of reproducing existing inequalities 
By directing campaigns at the US and EU markets, activists risk reproducing the unequal 
economic relations between rich consumers in the global North versus the much poorer 
suppliers in the global South. By leveraging consumer demand these campaigns are offering 
rich consumers the chance to dictate the practices of poor producers by voting through their 
consumption decisions. Those with more money potentially have more votes. 
These concerns resonate with those of scholars who have remained sceptical of the 
emancipatory potential of a global civil society (Chandhoke 2002, Ford 2003, Amoore and 
Langley 2004). For example, Pasha and Blaney (1998, p. 411) argue that while global civil 
society holds some democratic potential, it also holds many contradictions ‘as a site of both 
inequality and movements to redress inequality, of seemingly incommensurable identities and 
values and the negotiation of commonalities, of imposition and domination and the 
possibility of conversation and democracy.’ The concern is that much of the work of these 
global activists has the potential to compromise local autonomy and local control of 
development policies, especially in the global South. While these campaigns and the often 
‘private’ regulatory initiatives that result exert significant influence on the global South, the 
representation of Southern stakeholders in such global civil society-led initiatives remains 
low (Dingwerth 2008). Global activists risk simply reproducing existing inequalities 
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underpinning the international political economy while obscuring these inequalities by 
advocating a Western vision of ‘global’ values (Pasha and Blaney 1998). 
The remainder of the article is divided to reflect this two-part critique. In the first 
section, I evaluate the campaigns based on their ability to address some of the major issues 
underlying environmental problems, namely, poverty, market failures, a lack of technology, 
and weak institutions as well as the much tougher issues of overconsumption and inequality. 
In the second section, I evaluate the efforts of the campaigns to challenge the existing power 
asymmetries in the global economy and base this analysis on their ability to overcome the 
limitations of selection bias when choosing targets through their efforts to maximise the 
impact of direct-targeting and to shift regulatory power from political and industrial centres 
to the populations these campaigns attempt to empower. 
 
Overcoming the limitations of working within markets 
The NDG campaign addresses many of the underlying causes of environmental degradation 
quite effectively. The campaign’s use of the market mechanism to promote its goals 
maintains and promotes free trade and free market values. Increasingly strict adherence to 
these economic principles has, arguably, been one of the main catalysts for the unprecedented 
economic growth of recent times – and the concomitant reduction in absolute poverty. 
In economics, a market failure refers to the inefficient allocation of goods or services 
in a society, often the result of incomplete information (Stigler 1961). By informing the 
public of the hidden environmental costs of gold production and encouraging consumers 
along the supply-chain to choose less destructive options they are creating demand for an 
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environmentally sound alternative. Activists and industry are now working towards 
institutionalizing this market mechanism in the form of certified gold products.  
The campaign encourages ingenuity through its use of shame tactics. By raising the 
costs of degrading the environment, activists create monetary incentives to develop and 
implement innovative technological and managerial fixes for environmental problems.  
And finally, by engaging with industry actors directly and negotiating compromises 
that allow for reasonable reforms of the gold mining sector, the NDG campaign promotes 
cooperation between industry and activists. This should lead to the development of more 
effective institutions, such as, third-party certification. 
 The campaign represents a movement to reform the metals industry and does not 
advocate for decreased production. By adhering to the economic tenets of free trade and free 
markets, the campaign does not attempt to reign in economic growth and so falls short of the 
goals of more radical environmentalists who call for limits to growth. Likewise, there is no 
attempt by the campaign to address problems of overconsumption and economic inequality, 
both of which can be seen as fundamental sources of environmental destruction. In fact, the 
certified product that results could actually be viewed as a step backward by making the 
industry and its products more palatable to socially and environmentally conscientious 
consumers.3 
The effects of the GF campaign on the ability to alleviate poverty are debatable. The 
campaign does not attempt to halt the free flow of capital that has helped increase rates of 
economic growth in both the developed and the developing world. However, developing 
countries tend to rely on primary resources for a large portion of their development dollars 
and so a perverse effect could eventually be the channelling of much needed funds away from 
developing nations toward more developed economies. To date, this remains purely 
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hypothetical as there is no evidence of any such trend.  In fact, one could argue that the 
campaign focuses on projects that are unnecessarily destructive to and uninvited by local 
communities and so reduces the burden of poverty. The aggregate effects – direct and indirect 
– are therefore ambiguous at this point. 
 Market failure occurs when the price of a good does not reflect the full costs or 
benefits to society and so results in an inefficient allocation of resources. The GF campaign 
can be seen as tackling market failures by nurturing a market for ‘socially responsible 
investment’ (SRI). It focuses on projects with negative externalities, hoping that the financial 
backing will be reallocated to less harmful projects. Through improved information, activists 
help industry realize the potential societal gains not previously captured. 
 The GF campaign encourages technological innovation by directing funds away from 
projects utilizing older, dirtier technologies. It pressures banks to invest in cleaner, more 
sustainable industries and this may translate into resources being channelled away from the 
more primitive extractive sector in favour of high technology and knowledge-based 
industries. Even if capital is not channelled away from resource extraction, best practices in 
environmental aspects of mining usually involve the use of high technology that is 
predominantly manufactured in the developed world, forcing developing countries to import 
these high value-added technologies, further decreasing their terms of trade. 
 By working directly with industry in order to, as RAN Executive Director Michael 
Brune (2006) has put it, ‘bypass the middleman’ (by which he means government), the 
campaign creates the basis for cooperation toward a greener path for the mining industry. 
Through their involvement in Bank Track, the campaign also works with intergovernmental 
organizations, specifically the UN, and helps to lay the foundation for tripartite cooperation 
and the building of more effective institutions. 
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 The campaign shows its commitment to longer-term environmental goals by 
advocating for investment to be channelled away from fossil fuels and toward renewable 
energy. With the focus on connecting the right to profit with the responsibility of 
sustainability, the campaign seems to encourage a new type of economy more interested in 
social and environmental health. The campaign’s manifesto, the ‘Collevecchio Declaration’, 
is based on the principle that there is an historic detachment between the world’s natural 
resource base, production, and consumption and as we reach the ecological limits, financial 
institutions must take their share of responsibility to reverse the effects of this detachment. 
This certainly seems to be a productive step toward fostering an economy based upon 
sustainability and ecological rights. 
 The campaign tackles some of the most visible examples of overconsumption and 
inequality by attempting to repel capital from investing in environmentally irresponsible 
resource extraction projects. This may not have much of an effect on the rich but, by 
protecting the natural environment, the poorest – who tend to rely the most heavily on natural 
resources for their well-being – should be better off. 
 
Overcoming the limitations of selective targeting 
The second potential limitation of this activist strategy is the selective nature of campaign 
targeting, which itself has two potential limitations: campaigns may only be effective for 






Campaigns as only effective for certain industries 
Both campaigns are very aware of the selection bias present when choosing which firms to 
target. In fact, the effectiveness of their strategy depends on it. The original idea for the NDG 
campaign was to identify and target the most susceptible firms within the multiple resource 
chains that the mining industry feeds into. The campaigners needed a leverage point and the 
gold jewellery supply chain seemed a good fit. While most mined minerals find their way 
into myriad products where they remain hidden from the consciousness of consumers, the 
consumer market for gold was dominated by demand from the gold jewellery industry where 
the gold is prominently displayed for the beauty and status it conveys. The campaigners 
hoped to apply pressure to gold miners through the demand of the jewellery companies. If 
they could succeed in getting a few large, diversified miners on board, then there was a good 
chance that the gains made in changing practices would then be transferred to these 
companies’ projects extracting other metals and minerals as well (NDG, personal 
communication, October 20, 2010). Additionally, the campaigners did not target gold 
jewellers indiscriminately; they were very aware that not all jewellers would find their 
campaign strategy equally threatening. They instead focused on the highly branded, luxury 
jewellers – like Tiffany & Company, Cartier, and Rolex – knowing these companies could not 
stand for their reputations to become tarnished. While this strategic decision limited the 
campaign to a small portion of the market for gold jewellery, the activists hoped they could 
get a couple of these luxury jewellers onside, develop a model for responsible sourcing of 
jewellery, and then take this model to the lower-end and less branded jewellers (NDG, 
personal communication, October 20, 2010). In this way, the campaign hoped to go from a 
select few luxury jewellers, spread across the gold jewellery industry, affect the practices of 
gold suppliers down the commodity chain to gold miners, and spread from gold mining 
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practices to the practices of mines extracting other metals and minerals (NDG, personal 
communication, October 20, 2010).  
The GF campaign also recognises the insulated nature of resource extraction 
companies and so does not target, for example, coal mining companies directly. Additionally, 
coal is predominantly used for industrial purposes and, therefore, coal consumers are not very 
malleable targets. By targeting banks, the GF campaign has found a gateway into multiple 
commodity chains. In contrast to many extractives firms, commercial banks are heavily 
branded as they rely on their reputation to market many of their financial services, such as 
credit cards, loans, and other personal banking options. In fact, a survey of over 250 senior 
executives in global financial institutions conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the 
Economist Intelligence Unit found that the only concern these executives scored as more 
critical to attracting customers to their company than ‘underlying brand strength and 
awareness’ was the ‘quality of service and staff’, with other factors such as ‘financial 
performance’ ranking far down the list (VRL Publishing 2006). Additionally, the upstream, 
financial node is vital to virtually all commodity production and distribution; while it is 
difficult to target miners of coal directly, their projects all need financing. There are certainly 
multiple ways of raising capital for projects besides large, branded banks. The idea is that the 
campaign targets the largest and most branded banks to pull them into negotiations to set the 
parameters of acceptable investment practices – even if this means single-firm, internal 
commitments – to at least establish what responsible portfolios might look like (GF, personal 






Campaigns and the risk of reproducing existing inequalities 
A second, and arguably more disconcerting, limitation related to the selective nature of 
campaign targeting is that it runs the risk of reinforcing existing global inequalities. The vast 
majority of large natural resource extraction projects are located in the developing world and 
often on the lands of indigenous peoples. If due care is not taken to incorporate the needs and 
preferences of local communities, these campaigns could impose the values and preferences 
of the Northern communities in which they are embedded. The campaigns need to counter the 
potential side-effects that could result in their tactics empowering the already rich and 
powerful. These market-based campaigns empower consumers of jewellery and financial 
services, giving them voting rights over global practices through their consumption 
preferences. The targeting also, somewhat ironically, empowers the managers of the Northern 
companies they target by negotiating ‘private’ regulatory initiatives directly with them. 
The activists are well aware of these dangers and so seek to counter these adverse 
effects through various methods of empowering otherwise marginalised voices and 
promoting local autonomy for those occupying sites of resource extraction. There is 
significant overlap between these goals and the actions advocated by scholars and 
practitioners interested in transnational democracy promotion.  
Obviously, democracy is a hotly contested concept, but we need not wade very far 
into the debates for the purposes of understanding how shame campaigns may challenge 
existing political and economic inequalities. Porter and Ronit (2009) offer a parsimonious 
outline tracing the contours of democracy in a way that allows it to be applied to various 
transnational actors and institutions, namely, through the dimensions of transparency, 
participation, and accountability.  Jan Aart Scholte (2000) offers a similar framework specific 
to civil society’s ability to enhance the legitimacy of global governance, which includes: 
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giving voice to stakeholders, providing public education activities, fueling and facilitating 
debate, increasing public transparency of global governance, and increasing public 
accountability of regulatory agencies.  
By giving voice to stakeholders, civil society can provide an additional platform for 
those involved with and those affected by particular projects to express their interests and 
concerns. This is particularly important when we consider that many mining projects take 
place on the land of indigenous and other marginalized communities who tend to be under-
represented at the national level. Providing public education activities allows for the 
dissemination of information that otherwise might be unavailable to those directly affected 
and the public at large. Fueling and facilitating debate is a direct result of these two previous 
exercises, allowing representatives from both sides to state their case and supplying the 
groundwork for understanding and compromise. Increasing the transparency of global 
governance and increasing the accountability of regulatory agencies goes hand in hand. With 
the huge and concentrated capital expenditures of large extractive projects there are 
incentives to push ahead with controversial projects as well as the potential for corrupt 
practices at every stage of development. In addition to monitoring regulatory agencies, civil 
society can place issues on their agenda that might otherwise be swept aside due to a lack of 
expertise and resources. Furthermore, civil society action is able to create markets for 
products and projects that address these concerns, adding an additional mechanism for 
stakeholders to let their preferences be known.  
Building from this foundation, the following section will assess how each campaign 
fares in challenging existing inequalities through their ability to address unequal access to 
information about industry practices and unequal participation in project and policy decision-
making processes. Specifically, I assess the efforts of the campaigns to increase transparency 
of extractive industries and their governing structures, including the transparency of the 
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campaigns themselves. I outline the campaigns’ efforts to educate the public and assess the 
integrity of the information disseminated. And lastly, I review the campaigns’ commitment to 
encouraging a diversity of voices to sound-off on the issues. This entails facilitating debate 
between all stakeholders, including local communities, local business, and local institutions 
in the countries where the projects are located. In the remainder of the article, I evaluate both 
campaigns according to these criteria in that order, beginning with the NDG campaign. 
 Transparency is a major concern of the NDG campaign. The campaign’s listed goals 
include demands for full disclosure of the social and environmental effects of all projects and 
independent reviews of the social and environmental management practices of firms. As 
mentioned, work has been on-going toward construction of IRMA, a truly multi-stakeholder 
certification initiative for mine sites. Additionally, the RJC has a certification system in place 
for jewellery, though NDG campaigners have criticized this for not including adequate third-
party input and oversight. These criticisms notwithstanding, certification systems represent a 
movement toward increasing the transparency of the industry (Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010). 
 Education in the form of information dissemination is one of the key elements in the 
campaign’s program. The campaign’s website is a major source for information on the effects 
of gold mining, the leaders and laggards in the industry, and the campaign itself. It provides 
summaries of many controversial projects and testimonies from local activists working 
against each individual project. The press releases, interviews, advertising, and links to 
documentary movies and panel discussions all can be considered educational services. The 
‘Class Ring Campaign’ recruits students across North America to spread the word on 
campuses and their advertisements in major newspapers focus on informing the public of 
which firms are cooperating and which are not. 
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 While the integrity of the information is not in doubt, it could be considered 
incomplete. The group has a stated agenda and the information provided is meant to elicit a 
specific response from the audience. It is a call to arms and not a dispassionate assessment of 
the situation consisting of the pros and cons of gold mining. One need only glance at 
ResponsibleGold.org, an industry-run website, to see another interpretation of the situation 
offered by people with their own agenda that tells a much different story. The fact that the 
campaign has a clear agenda is not a condemnation of the information provided, but rather 
further motivation to create a public forum in which all viewpoints can be heard. 
 NDG’s ability to provide inclusive debate and local autonomy is hampered by a few 
fundamental characteristics of this type of campaign. First, by focusing on external markets 
for jewellery the campaign is in effect putting the onus on foreign consumers to decide the 
fate of local projects. Much of the information these consumers are basing their marketplace 
decisions on is provided by the campaign itself. This makes it imperative that the campaign 
provides a true and nuanced portrait of local events and debates. Second, the campaign 
encourages consumers to vote with their dollars. If you do not agree with the policies of a 
particular firm, do not support them with your patronage. This leads us to one of the most 
obvious and interesting side-effects of consumer campaigns, namely, who gets to vote.  
Voting with dollars means that the more money you have, and can potentially 
withhold, the louder your voice will be. So consumers in Western countries are playing a role 
in deciding the fate of mining projects in developing countries. It is important to note, 
however, that these consumers were always driving these decisions by contributing to the 
aggregate demand for gold. The campaign simply attempts to leverage these votes toward 
firms and projects it deems sustainable. 
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On the surface, it is difficult to argue with the goals and values of the NDG campaign. 
However, the effects of these values have a very real impact on where companies decide to 
dig. If the campaign helps to shut-down a proposed or operating mine that enjoys widespread 
support from the local community for its promise of jobs and development dollars, then the 
democratic deficit becomes more visible and more troubling.4 It is difficult to find clear-cut 
examples of this happening as there are always plenty of dissenting voices surrounding any 
large and potentially destructive project. There is, however, always a risk of this coming to 
pass and the only safeguard is the vigilance of activists in their research into and respect for 
the preferences of the local population.  
 The GF campaign seeks to increase the transparency of the mining industry through 
project and policy monitoring. They have been successful at tracking money from 
controversial projects back to the financiers as well as keeping an eye on individual banks’ 
investment portfolios. In addition, they trace financial institutions’ codes of conduct while 
monitoring and reporting on their compliance to these. The GF campaign also monitors the 
development of and compliance with various governing structures through their involvement 
with Bank Track. One of the six core commitments laid out in the Collevecchio Declaration, 
a document outlining the environmental NGO community’s expectations for financial 
institutions, is in fact a ‘commitment to transparency.’ There are two main programs focused 
on achieving this result: the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the Social Performance 
Indicators for the Financial Industry (SPI Finance). The GRI exists as an independent 
institution utilizing a multi-stakeholder process with a mission to develop and disseminate 
globally applicable Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. In 2003 NGOs teamed up with the 
UNEP-FI to draft a supplement focused on financial institutions. SPI Finance was developed 
in 2002 to create social performance and reporting indicators for ISO 14001-certified banks. 
These indicators are the same as those found in the GRI financial services sector supplement. 
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However, the campaigners at Bank Track have found these lacking as they are not focused 
enough on the social performance of financial portfolios (Bank Track, personal 
communication, October 26, 2006). 
 The GF campaign educates the public through its website and through the media. The 
website has information available about the campaign itself, the role of financial institutions, 
the individual projects of concern, and links to alternative financial services for customers of 
offending banks. In addition, it supplies the media with information through its online 
newsroom and contacts. Many more of its educational efforts are organized through its 
association with the Bank Track network. 
 A core aspiration of both the GF campaign and Bank Track is to include local voices 
in development decisions. Toward this end, they call for banks to ‘respect the rights of 
indigenous peoples to free, prior informed consent’ while offering direct support for project 
affected communities. The campaign does not discourage investment in all large development 
projects; they recognize local development needs and only target those projects that take 
place in protected forests, take no consideration of greenhouse gas emissions, or are 
undertaken without the prior consent of the community. In fact, they do not choose projects 
to target and instead treat complaints initiated and then forwarded to them by the affected 
communities themselves as a precondition to any response from the campaign (GF, personal 
communication, October 26, 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
Market-based, shame campaigns are a product of the historical period from whence they 
emerged. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that these activist instruments fit the 
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requirements of the liberal paradigm, which is itself the present stage in the evolution of 
mainstream environmental thought and practice. It is precisely the ability of market 
campaigns to make use of the forces of globalization through their use of information 
technology, network organization, and liberal market orientation that allow for them to 
achieve their goals. As such, they confront issues of absolute poverty, market failures, lack of 
technology, and poor institutions – all of which find feasible, albeit partial, solutions through 
globalization and economic growth. Thus, market campaigns achieve incremental reform in 
the right direction. 
While these campaigns attempt to connect companies’ right to profit with social and 
environmental responsibilities, they do not directly tackle overconsumption and have done 
very little work to reduce economic inequality. The GF campaign takes a slightly stronger 
position as it not only explicitly calls for rethinking economic priorities, but also actually 
works toward steering global capital away from the most destructive industries, thereby 
contributing to a push toward an economy based on social and ecological sustainability. 
The selective nature of industry targeting may limit the ability for activists to realize 
comprehensive regulatory coverage through shame campaigns, but activists maximize their 
impact through strategies encouraging the spread of best practices from firm to firm and from 
industry to industry. Despite these efforts to mitigate the limitations of their selectivity, they 
do still rely on the power of Northern consumers and so reflect existing global inequalities. 
However, the NDG and GF campaigns attempt to rectify existing political inequalities 
through their efforts to promote transparency, supply educational information, and facilitate 
inclusive debate amongst stakeholders. Both campaigns push for transparent business 
transactions, go to great lengths to disseminate information to all parties and the public at 
large, and give voice to concerned citizens and community stakeholders at the project site and 
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around the world. However, these campaigns do not represent all stakeholders and only 
supply one side of the debate. The information provided is presented to gain support for the 
campaign and does not reflect the opinions of industry and those in favor of the projects 
being scrutinized. This is not so much a criticism of the campaigns themselves but, rather, it 
is a recognition that for truly representative decision-making to take place there is still a need 
for a public forum in which all stakeholder voices can be heard. 
Market-based, shame campaigns occupy a contested political space where inequalities 
in the market are leveraged to redistribute political power elsewhere.  Specifically, campaign 
tactics reflect existing inequalities through their reliance on the asymmetrical power in 
markets as well as challenge inequalities through democracy promotion. These campaigns 
reflect many of the inherent contradictions of global civil society, but have found a way to 
challenge nonconsensual industry activities by circumventing the state institutions that often 
nurture their imposition. As long as activists are self-reflective about the inherent limitations 
of this approach, shame campaigns will remain a potent strategy to achieve industry reform. 
 
Notes 
1.   I conducted the 45 interviews between 2006 and 2012 as part of a larger research project 
focused on firm responses to direct-targeting campaigns. This larger set of interviews has 
provided the general context for this investigation while the eight interviews with key 
campaigners have provided the bulk of the interview-based information for this particular 
article. 
2. To see the advertisement, go to: http://www.nodirtygold.org/pubs/LeadersLaggards_lores.pdf; 




3.   It is theoretically possible that certification could increase resource use as those who already 
consume ecologically-friendly products substitute less ecologically-friendly versions for these 
as prices increase with labeling (Swallow and Sedjo 2000). Another possibility is that the 
standardization inherent in certification may increase trade and, therefore, consumption. 
4.   It is important to distinguish between what Mattli and Woods (2009, p. 13) describe as an 
‘idealist’ school and a ‘proceduralist’ school of public interest regulation. The idealist school 
‘holds that the public interest consist of the course of action that is best for society as a whole 
according to some absolute standard of values’ while the proceduralist school emphasizes 
standards of due process. Shutting down a project that enjoys widespread local support may 
sit well with the idealist school, providing the project is not in the broader public interest, but 
there may be issues raised from the perspective of the proceduralist school. 
  
References 
Agyeman, J., Bullard, R., and Evans, B., 2003. Just sustainabilities: development in an unequal 
world. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Auld, G., and Gulbrandsen, L., 2010. Transparency in nonstate certification: consequences for 
accountability and legitimacy. Global Environmental Politics, 10 (3), 97-119. 
Amoore, L., and Langley, P., 2004. Ambiguities of global civil society. Review of International 
Studies, 30 (1), 89–110. 
Baron, D., 2003. Private politics. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 12 (1), 31-66. 
Baron, D., and Yurday, E., 2004. Anatomy of a corporate campaign: Rainforest Action Network and 




Bartley, T., 2003. Certifying forests and factories: states, social movements, and the rise of private 
regulation in the apparel and forest products fields. Politics and Society, 31 (3), 433-464. 
Bernstein, S., 2001. The compromise of liberal environmentalism. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Bloomfield, M. J., 2012. Is forest certification a hegemonic force? The FSC and its challengers. The 
Journal of Environment & Development, 21 (4), 391-413. 
Brune, M., 2006, March 23. How green activists zero in on finance: a Q&A with environmental 
rainmaker Michael Brune. Interviewed by Leone, M. for CFO.com [online]. Available from: 
http://treesnotgunns.org/news/news_article/?uid=4261 [Accessed 24 March 2012]. 
Clapp, J. and Dauvergne, P., 2005. Paths to a green world: the political economy of the global 
environment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Dingwerth, K., 2008. Private transnational governance and the developing world: a comparative 
perspective. International Studies Quarterly, 52 (3), 607-634. 
Falkner, R., 2003. Private environmental governance and international relations: exploring the links. 
Global Environmental Politics, 3 (2), 72-87. 
Ford, L., 2003. Challenging global environmental governance: social movement agency and global 
civil society. Global Environmental Politics, 3 (2), 120-134. 
Friedman, T., 2001. A tiger by the tail. New York Times [online], 1 June. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/01/opinion/foreign-affairs-a-tiger-by-the-tail.html [Accessed 24 
March 2012]. 




Gollin, J., 2005, May 23. Corporate takeover: an interview with environmental rainmaker Jim Gollin. 
Interviewed by Thornton, J. for Tricycle: The Buddhist Review [online]. Available from: 
http://ran.org/corporate-takeover-interview-jim-gollin [Accessed 24 March 2012]. 
Keck, M. and Sikkink, K., 1998. Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks in international 
politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Khagram, S., Riker, J. V., and Sikkink, K., 2002. Restructuring world politics: transnational social 
movements, networks, and norms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Klein, N., 1999. No logo. New York: Picador. 
Klooster, D., 2005. Environmental certification of forests: the evolution of environmental governance 
in a commodity network. Journal of Rural Studies, 21 (4), 403-417. 
Klooster, D., 2006. Environmental certification of forests in Mexico: the political ecology of a 
nongovernmental market intervention. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 96 (3), 
541-565. 
Klooster, D., 2010. Standardizing sustainable development? The Forest Stewardship Council’s 
plantation policy review process as neoliberal environmental governance. Geoforum, 41 (1), 117-
129. 
Mattli, W. and Woods, N., 2009. In whose benefit? Explaining regulatory change in world politics. In: 
W. Mattli, and N. Woods, eds. The Politics of Global Regulation. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1-43. 
Miranda, M., Chambers, D., and Coumans, C., 2005. Framework for responsible mining: a guide to 
evolving standards. Center for Science in Public Participation (CSP2) and the World Resources 
Institute (WRI), 19. Bozeman, MT. 
Mutersbaugh, T., Klooster, D., Renard, M.C. and Taylor, P.L., 2005. Certifying rural spaces: quality–
certified products and rural governance. Journal of Rural Studies, 21 (4), 381-388. 
29 
	  
Nest, M., 2011. Coltan. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Newell, P., 2001. Environmental NGOs, TNCs, and the question of governance. In: D. Stevis and V. 
Assetto, eds. The International Political Economy of the Environment. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 85-107. 
Newell, P., 2006. Environmental justice movements: taking stock, moving forward. Environmental 
Politics, 15 (4), 656–660. 
Pasha, M. K. and Blaney, D.L., 1998. Elusive paradise: the promise and peril of global civil society. 
Alternatives, 23 (4), 417-451. 
Porter, T. and Ronit, K., eds., 2010. The challenges of global business authority: democratic renewal, 
stalemate or decay? Albany: SUNY Press. 
Princen, T., Maniates, M., and Conca, K., 2002. Introduction: confronting consumption. In: T. 
Princen, M. Maniates and K. Conca, eds. Confronting Consumption. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1-19. 
Richards, J., and Heard, J., 2005. European environmental NGOs: issues, resources and strategies in 
marine campaigns. Environmental Politics, 14 (1), 23–41. 
Ruggie, J. G., 2004. Reconstituting the global public domain: issues, actors, and practices. European 
Journal of International Relations, 10 (4), 499-531. 
Sasser, E. N.,2003. Gaining leverage: NGO influence on certification institutions in the forest 
products sector. In Forest policy for private forestry: global and regional challenges, edited by 
Teeter, L., Cashore, B. and Zhang, D. Wallingford: CABI, 229–244. 
Sasser, E. N., Prakash, A., Cashore, B., and Auld, G.,2006. Direct targeting as an NGO political 




Schlosberg, D., 2004. Reconceiving environmental justice: global movements and political theories. 
Environmental Politics, 13 (3), 517–540. 
Schurman, R., 2004. Fighting ‘frankenfoods’: industry opposition structures and the efficacy of the 
anti-biotech movement in Western Europe. Social Problems, 51 (2), 243-268. 
Stigler, G., 1961. The economics of information. Journal of Political Economy, 69 (3), 213-225. 
Stringer, C., 2006. Forest certification and changing global commodity chains. Journal of Economic 
Geography, 6 (5), 701-722. 
Swallow, S. K. and Sedjo, R. A., 2000. Eco-labeling consequences in general equilibrium. Land 
Economics, 76 (1), 28-36. 
Taylor, P.L., 2005. In the market but not of it: fair trade coffee and Forest Stewardship Council 
certification as market-based social change. World Development, 33 (1), 129-147. 
VRL Publishing. 2006. A hard sell. Bank Marketing International, 190. [online]. Available from: 
http://www.experian.com/whitepapers/bank_marketing_international.pdf [Accessed 24 March 
2012]. 
Wapner, P., 1996. Environmental activism and world civic politics. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
 
Websites 
NDG – http://www.nodirtygold.org  
GF – http://understory.ran.org/tag/global-finance-campaign/  
Earthworks – http://www.earthworksaction.org  
Bank Track – http://www.banktrack.org  
Oxfam America – http://www.oxfamamerica.org  
Responsible Gold – http://www.responsiblegold.org  
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Rainforest Action Network – http://www.ran.org  
IRMA – http://www.responsiblemining.net  
RJC – http://www.responsiblejewellery.com  
 
